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Non-Technical Summary  
Investment behavior is influenced by corporate taxation. High taxes hinder investment, whereas low 
tax rates favor it, especially within a context of cross-border direct investment. This claim is backed by 
a broad array of highly credible scientific literature. Nevertheless, in the public debate of tax 
practitioners, it can by no means be considered part of the common consensus. Whilst focusing on 
other determinants of direct investment sometimes any relevance of the taxation factor is denied. This 
paper has two overall goals: first, to empirically work out the effect of taxes on investment behavior 
and second, to document which requirements need to be fulfilled to arrive at a sound conclusion. 
The applied Microdatabase Direct Investment (MiDi) by the German Federal Bank covers the direct 
investment development of German parent companies abroad and that of foreign parent companies in 
Germany. The paper is structured in a mirror image style covering both of these investment directions. 
The timeline in question consists of 13 years and ranges from 1996 to 2008. The paper considers firm 
heterogeneity regarding their respective profit and loss histories and additionally analyzes the tax 
incentive to establish holding companies. As a robustness check, findings on Germany as a whole are 
supplemented by a subsample of the strongly export orientated federal state Baden-Württemberg. 
The descriptive analysis shows the rapid growth of both inbound and outbound international 
investment activity in the observed period from 1996 to 2008. The development of Baden-
Württemberg corporations has largely been the same as that of Germany as a whole. Since estimations 
require a minimum amount of variation and different comparison groups, proving the tax rate effect on 
investment here is only possible in the outbound case, but not in the inbound case.  
From the outbound case, I conclude that a by 10 percentage points increased corporate tax rate causes 
a 5.32% reduction in investment, measured by fixed assets. Accordingly, a by 10 percentage points 
lower corporate tax rate leads to about 5% higher investments. In a second step, I find empirical 
evidence that companies with an existing loss carryforward are less concerned with tax rates in their 
investment decisions. About half of the negative tax rate effect is compensated for firms with an 
existing loss carryforward. For firms with loss carryforwards, a tax rate increase of ten percentage 
points therefore only leads to a reduction in investment by 2.54%.  
The third step extends the empirical analysis into the research field concerned with corporations’ 
structures. Especially holding companies are set up by multinational corporations in tax favorable 
destinations in order for investments to be able to be structured optimally regarding tax. A decrease of 
ten percentage points in a country’s corporate tax rate causes an increase in the share of holding 
companies in all subsidiaries in that location by 0.55%. The effect is even stronger regarding 
withholding taxes. A ten percentage point decrease in withholding taxes causes an increase of 0.80% 
in holding companies relative to all kinds of subsidiaries. 
Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
Unternehmenssteuern beeinflussen das Investitionsverhalten. Hohe Steuern bremsen und niedrige 
Steuern begünstigen Investitionen, gerade auch im grenzüberschreitenden Kontext von 
Direktinvestitionen. Dies kann inzwischen als ein überzeugend abgesicherter Befund einer breiten 
wissenschaftlichen Literatur gelten. Gleichwohl genießt diese Einsicht in der öffentlichen und 
steuerpolitischen Debatte noch keineswegs einen breiten Konsens. In der Konzentration auf andere 
Investitionstreiber wird die Relevanz der Steuern zuweilen negiert. Dieses Papier verfolgt zwei Ziele: 
erstens, den Steuereffekt auf das Investitionsverhalten empirisch herauszuarbeiten und zweitens 
aufzuzeigen, welche Voraussetzungen für belastbare Ergebnisse erfüllt sein müssen. 
Die hier verwendete Mikrodatenbank Direktinvestitionen (MiDi) der Deutschen Bundesbank 
berücksichtigt Direktinvestitionen deutscher Muttergesellschaften im Ausland und ausländischer 
Muttergesellschaften in Deutschland. Das Papier ist spiegelbildlich aufgebaut und behandelt so beide 
Investitionsrichtungen. Der Betrachtungszeitraum umfasst die 13 Jahre von 1996-2008. Das Papier 
geht auf die Firmenheterogenität hinsichtlich deren Gewinn- und Verlusthistorie ein und untersucht 
zusätzlich den Steueranreiz für Holdinggründungen. Der gesamtdeutsche Befund wird mit den Daten 
eines spezifischen und besonders exportorientierten Bundeslandes, Baden-Württemberg, kontrastiert, 
um Hinweise auf die Allgemeingültigkeit der Befunde zu gewinnen. 
Die deskriptive Auswertung zeigt allgemein die rasante Zunahme der internationalen 
Investitionsaktivitäten im Untersuchungszeitraum 1996 bis 2008. Die Entwicklung der Unternehmen 
Baden-Württembergs entspricht weitgehend derjenigen in Gesamtdeutschland. Da Schätzungen ein 
Mindestmaß an Variation bzw. unterschiedlichen Vergleichsgruppen erfordern, ist der Nachweis des 
Steuersatzeffektes auf Investitionen nur im Outbound-Fall, nicht jedoch im Inbound-Fall möglich. 
Der Outbound-Fall zeigt, dass ein um 10 Prozentpunkte höherer Unternehmenssteuersatz um 5,32% 
geringere Investitionen in Gestalt von Sachanlagen bewirkt. Entsprechend bewirkt ein um 10 
Prozentpunkte niedrigerer Unternehmenssteuersatz um etwa 5% höhere Investitionen. In einem 
zweiten Schritt finde ich empirische Evidenz, dass Firmen mit bestehenden Verlustvorträgen bei ihren 
Investitionsentscheidungen weniger steuersensitiv sind. Bei Firmen mit bestehenden Verlustvorträgen 
wird rund die Hälfte des negativen Steuereffekts kompensiert. Ein um zehn Prozentpunkte höherer 
Steuersatz führt also nur zu einem Investitionsrückgang von 2,54%.  
Im dritten Schritt weitet die empirische Analyse den Blick auf das Forschungsfeld der 
Konzernstrukturen. Insbesondere Holdinggesellschaften werden von multinationalen Gesellschaften 
häufig in steuerlich attraktiven Standorten errichtet, um so die Investitionen steueroptimal zu 
strukturieren. Ein um zehn Prozentpunkte niedrigerer Unternehmenssteuersatz erhöht den Anteil der 
Holdings an allen Formen von Tochtergesellschaften eines Standorts um 0,55%. Bezüglich der 
Quellensteuer ist der Effekt noch stärker. Eine um zehn Prozentpunkte niedrigere Quellensteuer führt 
relativ zu allen Arten von Tochtergesellschaften zu 0,80% mehr Holdings. 
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1. Introduction 
Investment behavior is influenced by corporate taxation. High taxes hinder investment, 
whereas low tax rates favor it, especially within a context of cross-border direct 
investment. This claim is backed by a broad array of highly credible scientific literature.
1
 
Nevertheless, in the public debate of tax practitioners, it can by no means be considered 
part of the common consensus. Time and time again other determinants of direct 
investment are highlighted. The latter may stem from a desire for market development, 
whereby any relevance of the taxation factor is denied. Should a car manufacturer identify 
China as an emerging market, the medium-sized company supplying it has no other option 
but to invest there. It has to do so regardless of China’s taxation policy. The great strength 
of the econometric discipline lies in its capacity to incorporate different effects such as the 
suspected ‘China Effect’ in its mathematical models.  
Within such a framework this paper seeks to identify the econometric and micro 
economical approaches best suited for verifying the effect of taxation on direct investment 
behavior. Such is without neglecting any other influencing factors and recognizing areas 
that continue to exemplify problematic results. An analysis of German inbound and 
outbound direct investment is added. Findings on Germany as a whole are observed in 
contrast with the data of the strongly export orientated federal state Baden-Württemberg. 
This comparison indicates the overall validity of the findings. The paper considers firm’s 
heterogeneity regarding their respective profit and loss histories and may therefore be 
considered part of the cutting edge of current research efforts. With its analysis of holding 
companies and associated corporate group structuring this paper enters into a field that 
requires further detailed research in coming years. 
The foundational data shows the direct investment development of German parent 
companies abroad and that of foreign parent companies in Germany. Only limited liability 
companies are considered. The paper is structured in a mirror image style: The first part 
examines outbound investment and the second inbound investment. Both start off with a 
presentation of descriptive nature. The timeline for direct investment is shown for 
Germany as one and for the individual federal states. Special attention will be paid to the 
foreign investment of Baden-Württemberg firms and any investment of foreign firms 
within Baden-Württemberg. The timeline in question consists of 13 years and ranges from 
                                                           
1. So called meta studies summarize results of past investigations into the effect of tax on direct investment. Hereby they 
calculate the average ‘to be expected effect’. See De Mooij und Ederveen (2003) and Feld und Heckemeyer (2011). 
 
3 
 
1996 to 2008. This paper makes a conscious effort not to formulate an economic analysis 
of the most recent economic crisis, but instead strives to highlight the overall trend of 
investment developments. The effect of taxation will be examined by means of a linear 
estimation method, which allows for the econometric function to be derived in a 
transparent way. The empirical section will firstly examine the effect of corporate taxes on 
investment. Then existing tax loss carryforwards and investment structure decisions will 
also be illuminated. 
 
2. Influence of corporate taxation on investment behavior 
2.1 Investment of German companies abroad  
This paper’s first analytical step will look at German parent corporations’ investment 
abroad. The analysis is based on micro data. Unlike with aggregated macro-economic data, 
micro data analyses bears the advantage that recognized characteristics of corporations can 
be taken into account. Investment is primarily a flow value. When looking at individual 
corporations’ investment abroad however, stock values will have to be used, since only 
these are observable on the balance sheets. The dynamic will at a later stage be developed 
by econometrical estimations using the difference in observed stock values between two 
successive years. The resulting descriptive evaluation shows the development of the stock 
value ‘fixed assets’ and hereby reveals the extent to which German parent corporations are 
invested abroad. Intangible assets are included only to the degree to which they are 
activated on the balance sheets.  
 
2.1.1 Investment development 
Chart 1 illustrates the basic trend from 1996 to 2008 for Germany and Baden-
Württemberg. The chart is based on the German Federal Bank’s microdatabase direct 
investment (MiDi). It is mandatory for investors to report any cross border activity if their 
involvement constitutes 10% or more and the balance sheet of the respective foreign 
subsidiary exceeds 3 million euros. These foreign subsidiary balance sheets are made 
available in standardized form on an annual basis. The fixed asset values are taken from 
these balance sheets. As can be seen, fixed assets of German corporations abroad have 
increased by more than a threefold factor (3.25) from 120 bn. euros in 1996 to 390 bn. 
euros in 2008. Multinationals based in Baden-Württemberg have increased their assets 
abroad by an even higher factor of 3.4: from 17 bn. euros to 59 bn. euros in the last 13 
years.    
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Chart 1: Outbound fixed assets in bn. euros 
 
The ascent of both curves can be explained by the increase in subsidiaries abroad and the 
increased amount of assets these subsidiaries have at their disposal. In 1996, the average 
foreign subsidiary had 13.6 bn. euros in fixed assets. By 2008, this figure had increased to 
21.5 bn. euros. From 1996 to 2008, the number of counted foreign subsidiaries increased 
from 8,870 to 18,013.   
 
The number of foreign subsidiaries of Baden-Württemberg companies has increased from 
1,572 in 1996 to 3,641 in 2008. The average asset values of these subsidiaries has also seen 
an increase from 10.9 bn. euros in 1996 to 16.1 bn euros in 2008. The average foreign 
subsidiary asset value of Baden-Württemberg’s corporations is lower than that of Germany 
as a whole; possibly because numerous medium or even small sized Baden-Württemberg 
corporations have foreign subsidiaries.  
Chart 1 shows that foreign investment has increased. It would be mere speculation to make 
the drop in corporate tax rates responsible for this increase in foreign direct investment. 
Other plausible reasons include the increased economic performance of foreign locations, 
increased inflation or currency effects. When analyzing tax effects, it is also unsuitable to 
differentiate between target countries, since their tax rates vary over time and between one 
another. If anything, only an average effect may be identified.  
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Chart 2c: Outbound fixed assets 2008 
2.1.2 Comparing investment in the different German federal states  
Chart 2 shows in regular six year intervals 
which German federal states the investments 
into foreign subsidiaries stem from.
2
 Baden-
Württemberg’s share increases from 14% in 
1996 to 18% in 2002 and eventually comes to 
15% in 2008. Nordrhein-Westfahlen based 
companies have the highest share of foreign 
subsidiary investment in all 3 years. Although 
Hessen’s share has decreased somewhat, one 
must keep in mind that banks are not included 
in the observations.   
As seen in chart 1, the overall volume of 
investments has increased substantially. The 
volume of chart 2’s first diagram corresponds 
to the 120 bn. euros from chart 1. The same 
goes for chart 2’s third diagram and the 390 
bn. euros from 2008. In 2002, the overall 
assets held by foreign subsidiaries were some 
296 bn. euros.  
Looking at Baden-Württemberg, the 
percentages translate to 17.2 bn. euros (=14%) 
in 1996, 52.7 bn. euros (=18%) in 2002 and 
58.7 bn. euros (=15%) in 2008. The volume of 
foreign investment by corporations in Bayern 
and Baden-Württemberg are fairly similar. 
Niedersachsen comes 5
th
 with regards to 
foreign investment followed by Hamburg, 
Rheinland-Pfalz and Berlin.  
                                                           
2. It is worth pointing out that the described increase in German assets abroad from 1996 to 2008 may be 
subject to the influence of exchange rate effects. Towards the end of 1996, most investment targets of 
German investors’ balance sheets were in foreign currency and had to be converted to D-Mark. As a 
result, some of the changes in investment may merely be due to fluctuating exchange rates rather than 
actual investment activity. The Bundesbank has converted D-Mark values into euro values for the years 
1996 to 1998.    
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2.1.3 Corporate Tax development  
So far investments have only been looked at in terms of assets held by foreign subsidiaries. 
Considering the fact that ultimately the effect of corporate tax rates on investment is to be 
determined, the development of corporate tax rates has to be shown. Chart 3 illustrates the 
development of corporate tax rates some of those countries with the highest average stock 
of assets invested by German parent corporations. The investment development is also 
graphed for purposes of comparison.   
 
What can be seen in chart 3 is that whilst investment is on the rise, the average corporate 
tax rate of all countries falls. As a result, the used average corporate tax rate is reduced to 
that of the most relevant countries only, since a changing corporate tax rate in a country 
that receives no German investment may otherwise distort the picture. The corporate tax 
rate used in the chart is calculated out of that of 10 different countries. Included are those 
that traditionally receive a lot of investment from German companies such as France, 
Great-Britain, the Netherlands, Austria, Spain and the USA. The BRIC nations are 
represented by Brazil, China and Russia. Singapore completes the 10-country-list as a 
popular holding location. In 1999, the average of these countries’ corporate tax rates was 
35.0%. By 2008 it had sunk to a level of 28.0%. Investment increased, whereas average 
corporate taxation rates fell.  
 
Chart 3: Outbound fixed assets in bn. euros – all export countries   
 
A credible effect may not yet be derived from this chart. One may for instance argue that 
should investment increase for reasons other than corporate tax rate changes, they would 
still have to be carried out somewhere. A parallel decrease in corporate tax rates may 
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possibly be coincidental. On a descriptive level a clearer picture may be obtained if both 
the development of outbound investments as well as tax rates are shown per target country. 
Such is realized in chart 4.  
In chart 4, the (prior to this point) hidden thought of competition between the countries has 
now been incorporated. Perhaps multinational corporations have already decided to 
increase their foreign activity. The second step may be concerned with the question of 
where such an expansion may take place. This expansion could mean the expansion of 
existing subsidiaries or the setting up of additional new ones. The potential target countries 
are therefore in competition over such investments. A low or decreasing tax rate may 
function as a beneficial argument in such a competition.    
Chart 4 is made up of ten different diagrams, each of which show the development of 
investment and the corporate tax rate in a different country. In each of those countries the 
extent of investment by German corporations is larger in 2008 than it was in 1996. In nine 
out of these ten countries the corporate tax rate is lower in 2008 than it was in 1996. An 
overall trend exists. Brazil’s increased corporate tax rate marks an exception: From 25% in 
1996 to 34% in 2008. It is nevertheless apparent that the amount of change as well as the 
actual trail of the curves differ from country to country. Most countries show a consistent 
increase in incoming investment. Brazil, the Netherlands, Spain and the USA however also 
show temporary declines.  
In Austria, Spain and the USA, the corporate tax rate has been cut only once throughout 
the relevant time period. The other countries have cut their rate in several steps. Brazil, 
France and Russia’s rates have seen periods of temporary increase. With a drop of 18 
percentage points from 43% in 1996 to 25% in 2008 China records the largest corporate 
tax rate cut. China is followed by the Netherlands who cut their rate by 9.5 percentage 
points. Countries with an also significant cut rate of 9 percentage points are Brazil, Austria, 
Russia and Singapore. One must not overlook, however, that both the initial 1996 rate and 
the 2008 rate of corporate taxation significantly differ between the respective countries. In 
France, Spain and the USA, the corporate tax rate remains between 34% and 41% 
throughout the entire time period, whereas Singapore for example decreased its rate from 
27% in 1996 to 18% in 2008.   
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Chart 4: Outbound fixed assets on a per country basis in bn. euros  
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fixed assets [bn. €] tax rate [%]
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An effect of tax on investment may on the basis of these pictures be suspected, but not 
determined with absolute certainty. The strong 2005 increase in investment in Austria may 
well have been driven by the parallel cuts in corporate taxes. The tax cuts from 2004 
onwards in the Netherlands could feasibly have been responsible for stopping the 
downwards trend of investment. Considering a certain time lag in corporations’ investment 
behavior, the increased investment in Russia may also be attributed to decreased tax rates. 
Much like before, the one point of critique regarding the charts’ credibility is the lack of 
attention directed towards other factors possibly influencing investment. In order to tackle 
this problem, econometric estimation methods need to be drawn upon.  
 
2.1.4 Empirical investigating into the effect of tax rates on investment 
The estimation’s merit depends on the extent and precision with which all the factors 
influencing investment are included. Two approaches allow several of these influencing 
factors to be covered without having to collect any data. First of all, it seems very likely 
that a foreign subsidiary with a large amount of assets in one year will also have such a 
high level of assets in the following year. Therefore, instead of using the absolute level of 
assets, the first differences between investments serve as the dependent variable. In order 
to formulate a valid statement, all explanatory (= independent) variables have to be applied 
in first differences as well. Therefore, it is the tax rate difference between two years and 
not the tax rate itself that is included in the estimation.
3
 
The second approach neutralizes business cycle fluctuations and other extraordinary 
temporal effects. This is accomplished with the help of so-called annual dummies. For 
every year a variable is created that is one for this exact year and zero for all others. The 
effect of unusually high investment in 1999 for example would be recorded by the annual 
dummy for 1999. Usage of annual dummies would only prove to be problematic if all tax 
rate cuts were to occur in a single year. As can be seen from the above charts, this is not 
the case.  
Beyond these specification details, additional factors driving investment have to be thought 
of; for instance GDP, firm’s profitability and inflation. Country dummies may not be used 
here, as annual dummies and country dummies together would cover up any tax rate 
                                                           
3. See Wooldridge (2009) S. 393 ff. for a more technical explanation of the estimation in first differences.  
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effects. The remaining option is to check for characteristics of the individual countries. 
This means including individual influence factors in the estimation procedure. As outlined 
above, these are applied in first differences.  
GDP is supposed to be the most important control variable. The first difference detects 
GDP growth. It may represent a proxy for the size or development of the foreign target 
market. Controlled hereby is amongst others the talked about ‘China-Effect’. GDP per 
capita is also taken into account, which provides an insight into the extent to which 
domestic consumers can actually afford the given produce. At the same time it serves as a 
proxy for labor costs. The individual firm’s profitability of the currently considered period 
and the preceding period are also taken into account. One may assume a company that was 
profitable in the foregone period to invest more than an unprofitable company. As a 
standard controlling instance, the inflation rate is also included. Larger currency 
fluctuations may have an effect on the values of the fixed assets, as these have been 
converted into euro values. A currency variable is therefore created. It is standardized to 
the euro’s exchange rate deviation for the reference year of 1996. After all, different 
countries bear different levels of risk regarding investment. These investment risks are 
represented by the OECD’s country risk measure, which is also incorporated in the 
estimation procedure. Unlike in the first graph of chart 4 where only ten counties are 
considered, now 51 countries are included in the estimation. The ten original ones from the 
earlier estimation are among these 51 countries. They comprise of the four BRIC countries, 
the 29 OECD member states of 2008, the 8 EU member states that are not part of the 
OECD as well as ten other countries.
4
 For each of these countries the annual tax rate and 
the annual investment level is recorded. To ensure that the estimation focuses on those 
corporate groups with a genuine influence regarding decisions, a parallel focus on direct 
participation of 100% or directly held majority participation is put in place. The following 
table 0 shows a descriptive analysis based on the observations used in the estimations as 
well as a description of the variables. 
                                                           
4. The BRIC states are Brazil, China, India and Russia. The 2008 OECD members are Australia, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Greece, Great Britain, Island, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Canada, Luxemburg, Mexico, New-Zealand, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Austria, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, South-Korea, the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and the United States of America. The added EU member states are Bulgaria, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Slovenia, Rumania, and Cyprus. The additional ten countries are Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Chile, Hong Kong, Israel, Croatia, Serbia, Singapore, South-Africa, Thailand and the United Arab 
Emirates.  
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The following contains three tables with regression results. They are thematically 
structured and build on one another in that the first investigates the overall effect of tax on 
investment and the two following it concentrate on more detailed and in depth questions. 
The overall way to read these tables is identical and briefly summarized in the following. 
The dependent variable is the volume of fixed assets (table 1 and 2) or a measure that 
indicates whether a subsidiary is a holding company or not (table 3).  
The tax rates used in the estimation are the statutory ones (nominal rates). The influence of 
special aspects on the tax base, such as a varying ways of tax loss recognition
5
, are 
deliberately not made part of a general and straight forward approximated solution.
6
 
                                                           
5 See Jacob, Pasedag und Wagner (2011) for a discussion of the relationship between the tax rate and loss carryforwards. 
6 See Devereux und Griffith (2003) for a detailed path to creating effective tax rates. Elschner, Heckemeyer und Spengel 
(2011) use this method to calculate effective tax rates for European Union member states from 1998 to 2009. Becker 
und Fuest (2006) show that the attractiveness of a location may vary according to according to the chosen level of 
effective tax.  
Table 0: Descriptive Statistics 
  
Variable Definition Mean Std. Def. 
Fixed Assets Total assets reported in the financial statements; measured in EUR 
'000. 
11,430.38 61,491.70 
Tax Rate 
 
Statutory profit tax rate. 0.3118 0.0749 
Withholding Tax Withholding tax on dividends for the respective country/country 
pair. 
0.0208 0.0450 
Profitability Profit or loss for the financial year as reported by the balance sheet 
divided by total assets before current profits. 
0.0432 0.1260 
BaWü-Dummy 
 
Binary Variable indicating whether a subsidiary is situated in Baden-
Württemberg (1) or not (0).   
0.2280 0.4195 
Loss carryforward exists   Binary variable indicating whether a subsidiary has a loss 
carryfroward (1) or not (0).  
0.2929 0.4551 
GDP Gross Domestic Product measured in billion current USD. 1,761.30 3,083.17 
GDP per Capita Gross Domestic Product per home country national; measured in 
current USD '000. 
26,593.69 15,231.48 
Inflation Rate Inflation rate based on consumer prices (in %) 3.2160 4.7186 
OECD Country Risk OECD Country Risk Classification Method measures the country 
credit risk. Risk categories span from a low credit risk (0) to a high 
credit risk (7). 
0.7394 
 
 
 
1.3499 
Currency Fluctuation  Exchange rate deviation from the euro. 1996 is nominated to 1. 1.2552 1.3482 
The information is based on the 54,426 observations covered in the outbound estimations. The firm-specific variables are from 
the direct investment databank of the Deutsche Bundesbank. The tax variables are taken from the International Tax Handbook 
of the IBFD as well as the Worldwide Corporate Tax Guides of Ernst & Young. The Gross Domestic Product, the Gross Domestic 
Product per Capita and the Inflation Rate as well as the Currency Fluctuation are from the World Development Indicators 
Version 2011. The Country Risk rating is based on information from the OECD. 
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Regression table 1: Overall tax rate effect  
     (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)    (5)    (6)    (7)    (8) 
Tax Rate  -.532***  -.460***  -.520***  -.453***  -.657***  -.629**  -.482***  -.428*** 
 (.120) (.134) (.103) (.116) (.245) (.260) (.132) (.148) 
BaWü-Dummy        .025  -.031 
       (.081) (.085) 
BaWü x Tax Rate        -.242  -.153 
       (.225) (.239) 
Fixed Assets previous period   .486***   .478***   .418***   .486*** 
  (.043)  (.037)  (.081)  (.043) 
ln (Gross Domestic Product)  -.337  .648  -.347  .501  .008  1.32***  -.337  .647 
 (.267) (.540) (.246) (.503) (.218) (.430) (.269) (.543) 
ln (GDP per Capita)  1.10***  -.274  1.08***  -.121  .756***  -.880*  1.10***  -.273 
 (.265) (.538) (.245) (.499) (.240) (.474) (.267) (.541) 
Profitability   -.053   -.047   -.060   -.053  
 (.038)  (.034)  (.084)  (.038)  
Profitability previous period   .096***   .104***   .123**   .096***  
 (.029)  (.027)  (.063)  (.029)  
Inflation Rate  -.071  -.014  -.028  .022  -.154  -.042  -.071  -.014 
 (.064) (.033) (.021) (.024) (.146) (.163) (.064) (.033) 
OECD Country Risk  -.014  -.007  -.018*  -.009  -.021  -.012  -.014  -.007 
 (.011) (.012) (.009) (.010) (.024) (.026) (.011) (.012) 
Currency Fluctuation .054*** .021** .050*** .023** .041 .019 .054*** .021** 
 (.012) (.011) (.011) (.010) (.032) (.031) (.012) (.011) 
Exclusively BaWü        
100% participation only         
Majority participation only        
Direct participation only        
Year Dummies        
Observations 54,426 54,426 66,452 66,452 12,310 12,310 54,426 54,426 
AR(1)-Test   .000  .000  .000  .000 
AR(2)-Test   .470  .493   .232  .470 
Dependent variable: In (assets). The year dummies from 1997 to 2008 are included but not reported. Robust standard 
errors are in brackets. *, ** and *** point to significance of 10%, 5% and 1%. The numbers assigned to autocorrelation 
for the AR(1)- and AR(2)-Tests are p-values.  
The Baden-Württemberg-Dummy is 0, unless the parent corporation of the subsidiary in 
question is based in Baden-Württemberg. The year dummies are not reported, but are 
nevertheless part of every estimation.  
Panel estimation procedures are applied. In order to show the robustness of the results, the 
instrument variable estimations following Arellano and Bond (1991) (even columns in 
table 1) are run in addition to the standard OLS procedure (odd columns in table 1). For the 
instrument variable estimation the assets of the foregone period serve as the explanatory 
variable of the assets for the current period.
7
 All estimations are in first differences. This 
means that for both the dependent variable and the independent variables the difference to 
the prior year is used. This procedure has the advantage that it causes the size 
                                                           
7 See Cameron und Trivedi (2009) S. 287 ff. for a general explanation of the Arellano Bond estimator. 
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heterogeneity of the different subsidiaries to play a minimal role only. The procedure also 
highlights any changes a country may experience, such as a falling tax rate or rapidly 
growing GDP.  
Looking at regression table 1, it becomes apparent that taxes have in fact, as analytically 
expected a negative effect on investment.
8
 The tax rate effect on assets as a dependent 
variable is negative for all eight specifications as well as highly significant.
9
 The 
coefficients are semi-elasticities, given that the assets enter the equation in logarithm form 
and the tax rate doesn’t. This means that a tax rate increase of one percentage point leads to 
a decrease in investment by half a percent. A by 10 percentage points higher (lower) 
corporate tax rate means a decrease (increase) of about 5 percent in investment. The extent 
of the observed effect is fairly constant and ranges from -.428 in column 8 to -.657 in 
column 5. In analogue terms: A by one percentage point higher corporate tax rate causes an 
investment reduction of between 0.428% and 0.657%. The effects show no systematic 
differences between the statistical estimation method and the dynamic one or between the 
recognition of 100% participations and majority participations. 
The first four columns of regression table 1 make all observations part of the estimation 
without differentiating between the different federal states. The estimations in columns (5) 
and (6) are based only on those subsidiaries, whose parent corporations are based in 
Baden-Württemberg. This explains the significantly smaller amount of observations 
included in the estimations of these two columns. Looking at the coefficient alone, 
columns (5) and (6) seem to indicate multinationals from Baden-Württemberg to be 
particularly tax sensitive. Columns (7) and (8) check, whether such is actually the case on a 
statistically relevant level. The estimations in columns (7) and (8) therefore include all 
corporations and two additional variables. The BaWü-dummy marks those parent 
corporations that are situated in Baden-Württemberg. If it was positive and significant, it 
would mean that systematically more investment stems from Baden-Württemberg than is 
the case for the other federal states. The coefficient is insignificant, which renders any 
interpretation of its seize or sign redundant. The second new independent variable is the 
interaction term. It is the product of the BaWü-dummy and the tax rate and is also not 
significant. A statistically significant deviation of the tax rate sensitivity of Baden-
                                                           
8 See e.g. Keuschnigg (2008) for an analytical derivation of the effect average tax rate and marginal effective 
tax rate on cross-border investment decision. 
9 The respective valid tax rate of the foreign subsidiary is applied. Becker, Fuest and Spengel (2006) show 
that investment calculations on the basis of the whole group’s average tax rate may lead to other decisions.  
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Württemberg based parent corporations in particular may therefore not be identified. The 
numerically larger effect in columns (5) and (6) is thus predominantly a result of the 
changed assembly, and/or the reduced extent of the sample. Baden-Württemberg based 
international parent corporations do not systematically differ in the way they include the 
tax rate effect in their investment calculations to parent corporations from other federal 
states.  
Regarding the control variables, it becomes clear that profitability and assets of the 
foregone period have a significant and positive effect on investment in the current period. 
To be more precise, considerable increases in profitability and/or in assets of the prior 
period have a significant effect on the growth of assets in the current period because the 
estimation is in first differences. What is particularly interesting is the fact that profitability 
of the current period is insignificant, whilst that of the previous period is always highly 
significant. This seems intuitively sensible, since the money gained in the recent past may 
be used for new assets, whereas any gains from the current period have not yet been given 
the chance to be designated or decided upon. The temporal shift by one period can be 
explained by the fact that any signal indicating a certain subsidiary to be a lucrative 
investment opportunity will have to find its way to the parent corporation in Germany 
before any kind of investment can be authorized. For the effect of growing assets from the 
preceding period on current asset growth, the carried out aspects regarding profitability 
count as analogue.  
A higher GDP per capita causes higher investment in some estimations. This can be 
explained by the following. An increasingly wealthy state becomes ever more attractive as 
a target market and thus receives more investment. Looking at the currency variable, the 
significant coefficient implies that one ought to check for this effect, too. As expected, the 
OECD country risk rating is negative. This is because countries with a high risk rating 
receive rather little investment. The effect is, however, rarely of significance. The frequent 
insignificance may be traced back to the lack of third world high level risk countries within 
the 51 countries that the estimations are based on.  
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Regression table 2: Lower tax rate effect if loss carryforwards exist  
      (1)     (2)    (3)    (4)    (5)    (6) 
Tax Rate  -.637***  -.553***  -.612***  -.523***  -.636***  -.608*** 
 (.124) (.140) (.107) (.120) (.124) (.107) 
Loss carryforward (LC) exists   -.108***   -.102**   -.101***   -.088**   -.107***   -.100*** 
 (.040) (.048) (.036) (.042) (.040) (.036) 
LC exists x Tax Rate  .310***  .299**  .281***  .240*  .304**  .259** 
 (.120) (.144) (.109) (.129) (.122) (.110) 
BaWü-Dummy      -.054  -.052 
     (.035) (.040) 
BaWü x Tax Rate      -.024  -.084 
     (.064) (.059) 
Fixed Assets previous period   .485***   .478***   
  (.042)  (.037)   
ln (Gross Domestic Product 
GDP)  -.332  .654  -.342  .505  -.333  -.343 
 (.268) (.536) (.247) (.498) (.268) (.247) 
ln (GDP per Capita)  1.10***  -.292  1.07***  -.137  1.10***  1.07*** 
 (.266) (.534) (.245) (.494) (.266) (.245) 
Profitability  -.050  .075*  -.043  .072*  -.050  -.043 
 (.038) (.042) (.034) (.038) (.038) (.034) 
Profitability previous period  .093***  .191***  .099***  .187***  .093***  .099*** 
 (.029) (.034) (.027) (.031) (.029) (.027) 
Inflation Rate  -.071  -.013  -.028  -.021  -.071  -.028 
 (.064) (.032) (.021) (.024) (.064) (.021) 
OECD Country Risk  -.013  -.007  -.018*  -.009  -.013  -.018* 
 (.011) (.012) (.009) (.010) (.011) (.009) 
Currency Fluctuation .054*** .021* .050*** .023** .054*** .050*** 
 (.012) (.011) (.011) (.010) (.012) (.011) 
100% participation only      
Majority participation only      
Direct participation only      
Year Dummies      
Observations 54.426 54.426 66.452 66.452 54.426 66.452 
AR(1)-Test   .000  .000   
AR(2)-Test   .540  .562    
Dependent variable: In (assets). The Year Dummies from 1997 to 2008 are included but not reported. Robust 
standard errors are in brackets. *, ** and *** point to significance of 10%, 5% and 1%. The numbers assigned to 
autocorrelation for the AR(1)- and AR(2)-Tests are p-values.  
 
In regression table 1 the overall tax rate effect is investigated. Firms’ heterogeneity has 
largely been considered, since micro-data of individual corporations and not investment 
numbers aggregated into country or annual level have been used for the estimations. When 
investigating the tax rate effect on investment, it would be rather helpful to be able to 
isolate corporations that are either very strongly or not at all affected by the tax rate. The 
latter kind could theoretically be foreign subsidiaries that are granted a period free of 
taxation, a so called ‘tax holiday’. The identification of such subsidiaries is difficult, since 
such incentives are currently mostly handled on an individual base. Such exemption from 
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taxation should also not be granted to too many subsidiaries. There is nonetheless another 
way through which corporations more or less affected by taxes can be identified. The tax 
rate is significantly less relevant for corporations with loss carryforwards. After all, they 
have the possibility to guard their profits from being taxed by using some or all losses 
carried forward from past periods.
10
 Table 2 shows the results of estimations that follow 
such a distributive approach.  
The number of observations in regression table 2 show that again all the subsidiaries are 
included in the estimations. The control variables match the ones in regression table 1. The 
dependent variable is still represented by tangible and intangible assets. The newly added 
dummy variable loss carryforward exists is 1 if the subsidiary can transfer losses from the 
previous period. Otherwise it is zero. As anticipated, the effect is significantly negative, 
which means the subsidiaries with an existing loss carryforward invest around 10% more 
than those without. This could be because the parent corporation has reacted to its 
subsidiary’s recent failings and is subsequently making less means for investment 
available. It could also be down to the subsidiary’s internal financing’s lack of investment 
means.
11
   
The focus will now shift towards the newly introduced interaction term LC exists x Tax 
Rate. It records the extent to which the existence of a loss carryforward influences the tax 
elasticity of investment. It may be observed, at first glance, that as in table 1 the single tax 
rate effect is negative and highly significant for all estimation procedures. The interaction 
term runs contrary to the tax rate effect. The coefficient of LC exists x Tax Rate is 
consistently positive and significant. The tax rate maintains its overall negative effect on 
firms with loss carryforwards. This effect, however, is significantly lower with such 
subsidiaries. About half of the negative tax rate effect is compensated in the presence of a 
loss carryforward. In column (1), the pure tax rate effect is -0.637 and the interaction term 
is 0.310. The sum of the effect hereby comes to merely -0.327. A by one percentage point 
increased tax rate will only lead to a 0.327% reduction of the parent corporation’s 
investment into a subsidiary. The results in columns (2), (3) and (4) and those in column 
(1) are qualitatively roughly equivalent.  
                                                           
10 The effect of losses in the context of taxation has long been researched on a theoretical and an analytical 
level. See Altshuler und Auerbach (1990), Niemann (2004). In recent times the topic has found its way into 
the empirical literature. See Edgerton (2010) as well as Dreßler und Overesch (2010). 
11 Since losses in the foreign subsidiary are isolated with regards to tax, those losses may generally not be 
accounted for by partners, nor with those partners in or outside the country. See Herzig (2005). 
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It is plausible for the existing loss carryforward to compensate the tax rate effect to a 
partial extent only. Firstly, the subsidiaries’ loss carryforwards will eventually be used up. 
Secondly, some countries enforce a minimum taxation regulation. Hereby only partial 
netting out is possible. Thirdly, loss carryforwards may expire due to temporal restrictions 
or any kind of restructuring. In columns (5) and (6) the BaWü dummy and its interaction 
with the tax rate is added. As seen in the first regression table, the manner in which Baden-
Württemberg parent corporations invest in their subsidiaries does not systematically differ 
to that of the parent corporations in other federal states. The effort regarding the tax rate 
effect or the compensating impact of existing loss carryforwards are as a result also 
applicable to Baden-Württemberg firms. Very high detected volumes of unused loss 
carryforwards of German and foreign corporations suggest that this aspect is by no means 
an exotic or peripheral topic.
12
 
The first two regression tables show the effect of corporate taxation on the level of 
investment, which is measured in fixed assets. Multinational corporations have the 
opportunity to decide on the amount of fixed assets as well as to structure their investments 
into different special forms. The amount invested is hereby of less importance. It is much 
more the way in which these investments are embedded in the corporation’s network that is 
relevant. The third section of this empirical part focuses on such analyses of corporations’ 
structures. An obvious example of such structures will be picked out and examined. 
The assets considered above are primarily found in producing subsidiaries. The production 
site choice may be subject to various non-tax related arguments. Despite the fact that the 
implemented control variables largely control for the influence of such aspects, it would be 
interesting to analyze those firms that are chiefly driven by tax factors, as opposed to any 
other kind of influencing factors. Holding companies can be viewed as such a form of 
subsidiary. When establishing such a holding company, a corporation will be swayed 
especially by tax related arguments. In comparison, tax related arguments will carry much 
less weight in an argument over where to actually produce. In locations that are favorable 
from a tax point of view, the number of holding companies in proportion to all observed 
subsidiaries should be high.
13
 
 
                                                           
12 In 2004 the German Ministry of Finance declared a loss allocation potential of over 250bn. euros. See 
Müller-Gatermann (2004) p. 467. 
13 Heckemeyer and Spengel (2008) deliver an estimation of the extent of profit transfers of multinational 
corporations. Such transfer for tax reasons are sensible from production sites with a high tax rate to holding 
companies in a low tax rate location. 
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Regression table 3: Low tax rate countries as preferred locations for holding companies  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Tax Rate -.037***  -.031***  -.055**  -.071***  -.037***  -.031***  -.055**  -.070*** 
 (.013) (.011) (.023) (.021) (.013) (.011) (.023) (.021) 
Withholding Tax       -.080***   -.090***   .028   .007 
     (.013) (.012) (.031) (.027) 
ln (Gross Domestic Product 
GDP) .013***  .011***  .012***  .013***  .013***  .011***  .012***  .013*** 
 (.001) (.001) (.002) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.002) (.001) 
ln (GDP per Capita) .002  .006***  -.002  .002  .002  .007***  -.002**  .002 
 (.002) (.001) (.003) (.002) (.002) (.001) (.003) (.002) 
Profitability -.010  -.011**  -.018  -.004  -.010*  -.011**  -.017  -.004 
 (.006) (.005) (.011) (.010) (.006) (.005) (.011) (.010) 
Inflation Rate .017  .013*  .056***  .048**  .019*  .016**  .054***  .047** 
 (.011) (.007) (.021) (.019) (.011) (.007) (.021) (.019) 
OECD Country Risk -.003**  -.002***  -.003  -.002  -.002**  -.002**  -.003  -.002 
 (.001) (.001) (.002) (.002) (.001) (.001) (.002) (.002) 
Currency Fluctuation -.003*** -.002*** -.002** -.002*** -.002*** -.001*** -.002*** -.002*** 
 (.000) (.000) (.001) (.001) (.000) (.000) (.001) (.001) 
Exclusively BaWü        
100% participation only         
Majority participation only        
Direct participation only        
Year Dummies        
Observations 82.063  101.484 17.953 21.682 81.917  101.292 17.931 21.652 
Dependent variable: Dummy for the existence (1) or non-existence (0) of a holding company. The Year Dummies from 
1997 to 2008 are included but not reported. Robust standard errors are in brackets. *, ** and *** point to significance of 
10%, 5% and 1%.      
A detailed analysis would answer such a question with a counter variable model.
14
 Here, 
the basic linear estimation should be sufficient to show that the effect exists. The 
estimations of regression table 3 are thus based on the standard method OLS.
15
 Dynamic 
estimations with a past parameter and instrumentation are not appropriate here, as it is not 
a growing set (like with the investment) that is being examined. It is for the same reason, 
that the estimations here are not (like in the first two tables) in first differences.  
The dependent variable in table 3 is a dummy which is one if the observed subsidiary is a 
holding company. It is zero if the subsidiary is a production company or a service company 
without a holding function. As can be seen from regression table 3, the tax rate effect is 
negative and highly significant for all specifications. This means that in locations with a 
low tax rate the fraction of holding companies in relation to the number of subsidiaries is 
relatively high. The results confirm the hypothesis that when looking for a location for a 
                                                           
14 See Winkelmann (2008) for a technical explanation of such counting variable models. 
15 See Angrist und Pischke (2009) p. 25 ff. for the suitability of the standard OLS procedure for an 
approximate solution for such a question or for a general execution see v. Auer  (2007) p. 13 ff. 
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holding company, low tax rates are particularly important. The coefficient of -0.031 in 
column (2) indicates that a corporate tax rate cut of one percentage point causes the share 
of holdings with all subsidiaries to increase by 0.031%. Across all estimations, a 10 
percentage point tax rate drop brings about an increase in the share of holdings of about 
0.5%. Despite being numerically small, this effect is nevertheless statistically significant. 
One must not forget that a corporate holding company can easily assemble dozens of 
production subsidiaries. This means that already one or a few holdings suffice for a group 
to set up a tax efficient structure. 
The corporate tax rate will play a big role in any holding company location decision. 
Additionally, further taxes might play an essential role, once profits are repatriated home to 
the German parent corporation. This so called withholding tax is thus added in columns (5) 
to (8). Columns (5) and (6) show that a low withholding tax attracts holdings. This effect is 
considerably stronger than that of the corporate tax rate. A one percent increase in holdings 
(relative to all recorded subsidiaries in that country and year) is caused by a reduction in 
the withholding tax by 10 percentage points. In columns (7) and (8) this effect is no longer 
detectable. As mentioned earlier, these results are based on the significantly smaller 
Baden-Württemberg sample. As a result they are not particularly reliable. With regards to 
the overall tax rate effect, there is no systematic difference in the way companies from 
Baden-Württemberg and those from other federal states calculate and plan their structures. 
This observation falls in line with the above analysis. 
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2.2 Foreign corporations’ investment in Germany  
Section 2.1 looked at the tax rate effect on investments of German parent corporations in 
their foreign subsidiaries. This section will focus on the reverse. It will illuminate where 
and how foreign corporations are invested in Germany. Generally speaking, the effects 
taken from the earlier estimation results should also show up for investment into Germany 
– so called inbound investments. The descriptive structure is the mirror image of that of 
part 2.1. The estimations, however, will show that there is much less potential for 
identification with the inbound part. The reasons for this will be explained in that 
respective section. The econometric section of this part is less about gaining thematic 
results than demonstrating why empirical analyses under certain conditions may not be 
conclusive.  
Chart 5: Inbound fixed assets in bn. euros   
 
2.2.1 Investment development  
The media likes to name and portray Germany as the ‘Export World Champion’. The 
products sold abroad measure is what is mostly to be meant with this. The comparison 
between chart 5 and chart 1 shows that the world champion title would also apply when 
looking at German companies’ assets. German companies are much more heavily invested 
abroad than foreign companies are invested in Germany. Chart 1 shows a range from 
120bn euros in 1996 to 390 bn. euros in 2008. Chart 5 shows that the foreign corporations’ 
assets in Germany have gone from only 35.6bn euros in 1996 to 66.5bn euros in 2008. The 
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Chart 6c: Inbound fixed assets 2008 
numbers have doubled in size for the whole of Germany. Baden-Württemberg has seen an 
increase by a factor of 2.27, from 4.1bn euros to 9.3bn euros.  
The increased aggregated level of investment can be traced back to the enlarged average 
size and number of foreign companies’ subsidiaries in Germany. In 1996 there where 
3,927 such subsidiaries in Germany. By 2008 that number had risen to 4,619. The average 
size of a subsidiary was 9.1bn euros in 1996 and 14.4bn euros by 2008. The number of 
subsidiaries has risen by only 17.7% compared to the 58% that they have increased in 
average size. The aggregated growth is therefore mainly caused by the latter effect.   
 
2.2.2 Comparing investment in the different German federal states  
 
 
Analogous to chart 2 from the outbound 
investment part 2.1, chart 6 shows in regular 
intervals for the years 1996, 2002 and 2008 what 
share of the investment by foreign companies 
goes to which federal state. As before, it is the 
fixed assets which are analyzed. The four large 
federal states Nordrhein-Westfahlen, Baden-
Württemberg, Hessen and Bayern share two 
thirds of the total amount of foreign assets 
between them. Chart 5 shows that investment into 
Baden-Württemberg has increased by more than 
that into Germany as a whole. As a result, Baden-
Württemberg’s share has increased from 12% in 
1996 to 14% in 2008. The overall volume has 
gone from 35.6bn. euros in 1996 to 48.1bn euros 
in 2002 to 66.5bn euros in 2008. Of this 4.1bn 
euros in 1996, 5.4bn euros in 2002 and 9.3bn 
euros in 2008 have gone to Baden-Württemberg. 
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2.2.3 Corporate Tax development 
The German corporate tax rate has been lowered in several steps throughout the thirteen 
year observation period. The tax-induced attractiveness of investing in Germany is 
identical for all foreign corporations. Chart 7 shows the corporate tax rate development: A 
reduction from 57.25% in 1996 to 30.95% in 2008. Solidarity surcharge as well as a 
uniform trade tax multiplier of 410% has been taken into account here. There is no 
differentiation according to trade tax, because putting federal city states and larger ones on 
the same level regarding average trade tax would result in misleading impressions.      
Chart 7: Inbound fixed assets in bn. euros 
 
Chart 7 demonstrates that investment, as measured by assets held in Germany, has risen 
whilst the combined corporate tax rate has fallen. A tax rate effect on investment may not 
reliably be derived from this. If the tax rate in other countries has fallen by more than that 
in Germany, investors may have looked elsewhere out of tax concern. Investment may also 
have risen for completely tax-unrelated reasons. Analogous to the outbound observations 
aspects like GDP, firm profitability and inflation would have to be considered. 
As mentioned above, all foreign corporations see the German tax rate development in the 
same way. This is why the diagrams in chart 8 all have an identical tax rate development. 
Chart 8 shows the reduction in the German corporate tax burden on the investment 
development for five chosen countries.  
Chart 8 shows, that investment by foreign corporations has developed differently 
depending on in which foreign country the investing corporation is located. The 
Netherlands, Great Britain and Spain hold more assets in Germany in 2008 than they did in 
1996. 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
fixed assets [bn. €] tax rate [%]
23 
 
Chart 8: Inbound fixed assets on a per country basis in bn. Euros 
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German assets held by US and South-Korean corporations have, on the other hand been 
receding. The different scaling is something to watch out for here. In 2008, US 
corporations hold 3.7bn euros in German assets, whereas companies from Spain only hold 
3.1bn euros. With 6bn euros, the investment coming from Great Britain exceeds that 
coming directly from the US. 
It is worth pointing out that US corporations for example may execute their investments in 
Germany via an intermediary company based in a different country. Since this would have 
an effect on the statistic, the single country trends must not be overrated. On aggregate 
(refer to chart 7) this aspect will not be visible.   
The investment from the Netherlands, Great Britain and Spain suggest a possible positive 
correlation between a reduced tax rate and higher investment. Such, on the other hand, is 
not implied by the charts of the USA and South-Korea. 
The last illustration of chart 8 is a summary of all the diagrams in chart 8. It provides an 
overview on the basis of a standardized scale. The decreasing investment directly from the 
USA is particularly prominent. In contrast, investment coming from the Netherlands has 
been growing significantly. As pointed out above, this could be down to US-corporations’ 
increased tendency to use the Netherlands as a location for their intermediary companies as 
executors of their investment into Germany. If this is the case, then the two opposing 
effects would balance each other out. It is a well known fact that the Netherlands are 
generally a popular holding company location (see Mintz und Weichenrieder, 2010). In 
order to hereby explain the trend, the attractiveness of such a structure would have to have 
increased dramatically over the years. 
The German corporate tax rate for the years 1996, 2002 and 2008 is on the X-axis. An 
upward sloping straight line would suggest the expected indirectly proportional 
relationship between tax rate and investment. A downward sloping straight line, as in the 
USA case, would suggest a counterintuitive proportional relationship. An actual effect may 
not be derived from such a chart, since not all tax-unrelated influences are included.         
 
  2.2.4 Empirical investigation into the effect of tax on investment 
The tax rate effect based on outbound investment has been proven in several estimations in 
section 2.1. This effect should also generally apply for inbound investment. Upon further 
deliberation it becomes clear, that a possibly existent tax rate effect on inbound investment 
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cannot be proven via the estimation procedures outlined above. Becker, Fuest and 
Hemmelgarn (2006) have attempted to prove this effect. They investigated the effect of the 
2000 corporate tax reform, by looking at average values before and after the reform. A 
negative effect of tax on inbound investment is detected. The authors themselves point out 
that the magnitude of the identified effect is surprisingly large.  
In the case of outbound investment, considerable variations are present. This is because 
during the same years the respective countries have different tax rates, which they change 
at different times and to varying extents. For the inbound case, only unitary features of 
Germany (e.g. the German tax rate) can be drawn upon. As a result, there is not such a 
large scope for explanation. When trying to evaluate the tax effect on investment, the 
inbound case lacks an alternative investment opportunity in one or more additional 
countries. The outbound case and its 51 possible destination countries provide such an 
investment opportunity. An evaluation of the effect using our model based on international 
variations is hardly possible for the inbound case, as it lacks comparable measures. An 
estimation for the inbound case promises little success, as insufficient variation regarding 
the tax rates and control variables persist. An estimation for the inbound part is for these 
reasons deliberately not presented here.   
 
3. Summary and outlook 
The paper shows empirically that corporate taxes have a negative effect on investment. It 
highlights particularly which conclusions can be drawn from what approaches. The 
descriptive charts on annual investment may serve as a first starting point only. Reliable 
proof concerning the sought after tax effects may only be obtained by means of estimation 
procedures. Since estimations require a minimum amount of variation and different 
comparison groups, proving the tax rate effect on investment was only possible in the 
outbound case and not the inbound one. 
The development of direct investment by German parent corporations abroad and that of 
foreign corporations in Germany from 1996 to 2008 has been examined. Especially the 
descriptive analysis has segmented inbound and outbound investments for the different 
federal states. The descriptive analysis shows the rapid growth of international investment 
activity in the observed period from 1996 to 2008. The development of Baden-
Württemberg corporations has largely been the same as that of Germany as a whole. The 
empirical level also shows that Baden-Württemberg corporations’ investment calculations 
do not significantly differ to those of corporations from the rest of Germany.  
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The empirics exclusively focus on the outbound case. The estimations proceed in three 
different steps. The first step shows that the effect of corporate tax on the investment 
volume is negative. A by 10 percentage points increased (reduced) corporate tax rate 
causes a 5.32 percent reduction (increase) in investment, measured by fixed assets.  
The second step provides the analysis of empirical evidence for the fact that companies 
with an existing loss carryforward are less concerned with tax rates in their investment 
decisions. About half of the negative tax rate effect is compensated for firms with an 
existing loss carryforward. If the pure tax rate effect is -0.553 and the interaction term of 
an existing loss carryforward and the tax rate is 0.299, the summated effect is merely -
0.254. A tax rate increase of one percentage point therefore only leads to a reduction in 
investment by 0.254%.   
The third step extends the empirical analysis into the research field concerned with 
corporations’ structures. Especially holding companies are set up by multinational 
corporations in tax favorable destinations in order for investments to be able to be 
structured optimally regarding tax. Regression table 3 provides evidence for the idea that 
locations with a reasonably low corporate tax rate and low withholding taxes boast a 
relatively high number of holding companies. A decrease of ten percentage points in a 
country’s corporate tax rate causes an increase in the share of holding companies in all 
subsidiaries in that location by 0.55%. The effect is even stronger regarding withholding 
taxes. A ten percentage point decrease in withholding taxes causes an increase of 0.80% of 
holding companies relative to all kinds of subsidiaries. The relationship between tax and 
corporations’ structures is a field containing lots of future research questions. A more 
detailed competency in this field is relevant for tax policy, as it uncovers dodging reactions 
that are hidden from view when only investment numbers are looked at.  
The inbound case looks at foreign parent corporations` investment into their subsidiaries in 
Germany. It shows why an analysis based on estimations would not deliver meaningful 
results in this subset. The reason for this is the lack of variation of the relevant variables 
necessary for such an approach. The detailed descriptive analysis already leads to the 
conclusion that cross border investment into Germany has increased throughout the 
observed time period.
16
 A clear conclusion about whether this is because of the fallen 
corporate tax rate or other factors may not be drawn.  
                                                           
16 Especially the 2008 corporate tax rate reform and its reduction of the corporate tax rate from 25% to 15% 
could have attracted investors. There are, however, critics who claim that this effect of the reform has only 
a small reductive effect on the tax burden. See Radulescu und Stimmelmayr (2008). 
27 
 
Literature 
 
Altshuler, R. and A.J. Auerbach (1990): The Significance of Tax Law Asymmetries: An Empirical 
Investigation, in: Quarterly Journal of Economics 1990, 61-89. 
Angrist, J. and J.S. Pischke (2009): Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An Empiricist’s Companion, 
Princeton and Oxford 2009. 
Arellano, M. and S. Bond (1991): Some tests of specification for panel data: evidence and an 
application to employment equations, Review of Economic Studies 58, 277-297.  
Auer, L. and (2007): Ökonometrie, 4th edition, Berlin/Heidelberg 2007. 
Becker, J. and C. Fuest (2006): Ist Deutschland ein Hoch- oder Niedrigsteuerland? Der Versuch 
einer Synthese, Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik 7, 35-42. 
Becker, J., Fuest, C. and T. Hemmelgarn (2006): Corporate Tax Reform and Foreign Direct 
Investment in Germany – Evidence from Firm-Level Data: Working Paper August 2006. 
Becker, J., Fuest, C. and C. Spengel (2006): Konzernsteuerquote und Investitionsverhalten, 
Zeitschrift für betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung 58, 730-742. 
Cameron, C. and P. Trivedi (2009): Microeconometrics using Stata, College Station, TX 2009. 
De Mooij, R.A. and S. Ederveen (2003): Taxation and foreign direct investment: a synthesis of 
empirical research, International Tax and Public Finance 10, 673-693. 
Devereux, M.P. and R. Griffith (2003): Evaluating Tax Policy for Location Decisions, 
International Tax and Public Finance 10, 107 - 126. 
Dreßler, D. and M. Overesch (2010): Investment Impact of Tax Loss Treatment – Empirical 
Insights from a Panel of Multinationals, ZEW Discussion Paper 10-097. 
Edgerton, J. (2010): Investment incentives and corporate tax asymmetries, Journal of Public 
Economics 94, 936-952. 
Elschner, C., J.H. Heckemeyer and C. Spengel (2011): Besteuerungsprinzipien und effektive 
Unternehmenssteuerbelastungen in der Europäischen Union: Regelt sich die EU-weite 
Steuerharmonisierung von selbst?, Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik 12, 47–71. 
Feld, L. and J.H. Heckemeyer (2011): FDI and Taxation – A Meta Study, Journal of Economic 
Surveys 25, 233-272.  
Heckemeyer, J.H. and C. Spengel (2008): Ausmaß der Gewinnverlagerung multinationaler 
Unternehmen empirische Evidenz und Implikationen für die deutsche Steuerpolitik, 
Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik 9, 37-61. 
Herzig, N. (2005): Verluste im Körperschaftsteuerrecht, in: Verluste im Steuerrecht, Groll, Rüdiger 
von (ed.), Deutsche Steuerjuristische Gesellschaft e. V., Volume 28, Cologne 2005, 185-
203. 
Jacob, M., A. Pasedag and F.W. Wagner (2011): Werden niedrige Steuersätze in Osteuropa durch 
Verzicht auf Verlustverrechnung erkauft?, Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik 12, 72–91. 
Keuschnigg, C. (2008): Exports, foreign direct investment, and the costs of corporate taxation, 
International Tax and Public Finance 15, 460-477. 
Mintz, J. and A. Weichenrieder (2010): The indirect side of direct investment – multinational 
company finance and taxation, Cambridge, MA 2010. 
Müller-Gatermann, G. (2004): Aktuelles zum Unternehmenssteuerrecht, Die Wirtschaftsprüfung 
2004, 467-476. 
Niemann, R. (2004): Investitionswirkungen steuerlicher Verlustvorträge – Wie schädlich ist die 
Mindestbesteuerung?, Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaft 2004, 359-384. 
Radulescu, D.M. and M. Stimmelmayr (2008): Die Unternehmensteuerreform 2008: Eine 
Reformalternative für Deutschland?, Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik 9, 19-36. 
Winkelmann, R. (2008): Econometric analysis of count data, Berlin and Heidelberg 2008. 
Wooldridge, J. M. (2008): Introductory Econometrics, 4
th
 edition, Scarborough 2009. 
 
